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Abstract Farmer innovation diffusion (FID) in the
developing world is not simply the adoption of an inno-
vation made by farmers, but a process of communication
and cooperation between farmers, governments, and other
stakeholders. While increasing attention has been paid to
farmer innovation, little is known about how farmers’
innovations are successfully diffused. To fill this gap, this
paper aims to address the following questions: What con-
ditions are necessary for farmers to participate in FID?
How is a collaborative network built up between farmers
and stakeholders for this purpose? And what roles can
government play? The above questions are addressed
through analysis of the diffusion of winter greenhouse
technology in China. A framework for analyzing a FID
system is developed, and the conclusion is drawn that
building mutual trust and collaborative networks is crucial
for the success of FID. Furthermore, this network building
can be broken down into various levels with different
scales, speeds and consequences for FID: informal net-
works among farmers themselves, farmer-led networks,
and government-facilitated networks. The success of gov-
ernment intervention depends upon building and enhancing
the collaborative networks in which farmer leadership is
crucial.
Keywords Farmer innovation diffusion  Farmer
leadership  Government intervention  Collaborative
network building  Winter greenhouse diffusion  China
Abbreviations
DWG Dongwugou
FID Farmer innovation diffusion
NGO Non-governmental organization
SYZ Shanyuanzhu
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Introduction
In the last three decades or so, the international community
has paid increasing attention to farmer innovation, defined as
any technology invention or improvement made by rural
people in order to cope with the complexity of local
resource, ecological, economic, and social conditions
(Chambers 1983; Chambers et al. 1989; Biggs 1990; Re-
ijnties et al. 1992; Rajasekaran 1993; Critchley et al. 1999;
World Bank 2004; Wortmann et al. 2005). While the
emphasis has been on the practicality of local knowledge
and farmer innovation within the community, we know little
about how farmer innovation can be successfully diffused to
other rural areas with different ecological, economic, and
social environments. The term farmer innovation diffusion
(FID) in this paper can be defined as a process of diffusing
farmer innovations to wider communities, which involves a
process of building collaborative networks for communi-
cation and cooperation between farmers, governments, and
other stakeholders such as agricultural extension staff and
non-government organizations.
FID is usually achieved through informal farmers’ net-
works, through private companies or through the public
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domain (e.g., public funding, media, agricultural extension
agencies, government or non-government agencies), whe-
ther for commercial benefit or public good. In this paper we
are concerned with FID by means of non-commercial
channels, which brings farmer innovation into the dis-
course of local development and benefits wider commu-
nities. Special attention is given to the realization of
diffusion through outside intervention, especially by gov-
ernment. Commercialization is a separate issue we will not
touch on in this research.
The rationale of this paper is based upon the belief that
many farmer innovations in one area have the potential to
benefit the rural poor in other areas of the world who suffer
similar difficulties. Due to many barriers (e.g., information,
finance, and traditional production system), this diffusion
process is often blocked to a certain degree. Encouragingly,
there are many successful cases of FID via different
channels, organizations or external institutions. In partic-
ular, we are concerned with the role of government inter-
vention in rural China, where non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are underdeveloped and the agri-
cultural extension system is weak in delivering its services
to farmers (Hu et al. 2009). While there have been many
successful experiences in large-scale intervention and
promotion of FID, including the case of winter greenhouse
diffusion developed in this paper, little academic research
has been conducted to explain why some of these inter-
ventions have succeeded and others failed.
To fill this gap, this paper aims to address the following
questions: What are the conditions necessary for farmers to
participate in FID? How is a collaborative network built up
for this purpose? And what roles can and does government
play? The above questions are addressed through analysis
of the diffusion of winter greenhouse technology in China.
Innovation diffusion and networks: a literature review
FID across geographic, economic, and social boundaries
involves factors such as public resources and government
and non-governmental agencies. Despite the lack of liter-
ature addressing FID directly, there is much research that is
relevant to the theme of this paper. From the perspective of
communication and interaction between farmers and
external stakeholders, relevant debates can be divided into
four camps: innovation diffusion, technology choice,
agricultural innovation systems, and actor network
building.
Innovation diffusion as a part of the classic technology
transfer model treats agricultural innovation diffusion as a
process from scientific research institutes to farmers via
extension stations (Ro¨ling 1988; Scoones and Thompson
1994; Roux et al. 2006; Williams and Woodson 2012).
Focusing on how, why, and at what rate a new idea or
technology spreads among the members within a social
system, Rogers (1962) poses a useful analytical framework.
Not limiting himself to analysis of individual behaviors in
technology adoption, he emphasizes the roles of commu-
nication channels, opinion leaders, and social systems on
technology adoption. While Rogers’ framework offers
insight into the differences among community members in
technology learning and adoption (Heffernan et al. 2008),
the linear model has limitations when interpreting the
phenomenon of farmer innovation (Biggs 1990; Ruttan
1996; Ro¨ling 1994). This is because the rural poor in the
developing world are more likely to live in complex,
diverse, and risk-prone environments (Chambers et al.
1989; Pretty 1995). As a result, they may face serious
constraints from not only complicated ecological, eco-
nomic, and social environments, but also insufficient
information and poor capacity to bear any waves and
shocks from uncertain market or environmental conditions
(Wu 2003).
Taking into account the complexity and diversity of
rural livelihood systems in the developing world, innova-
tion diffusion can be viewed as a process of technology
choice. Schumacher (1973) emphasizes ‘‘appropriateness
to local people’’ as a primary factor to consider. A key
question arises here: who makes decisions on adoption or
rejection of a new technology and what factors influence
their judgment about the appropriateness of technology?
Disagreeing with the assumption of rational farmers used
in classic economics, Abrahamson (1991) argues that
potential adopters are often unable to assess the technical
efficiency of an innovation when they make a decision.
Instead, he distinguishes three alternative diffusion per-
spectives: (1) the fad perspective in which members of a
group imitate each other in terms of technology adoption or
rejection; (2) the fashion perspective, in which influential
organizations or individuals outside (‘‘fashion-setters’’) are
imitated by members of the adopter group; and (3) the
forced-selection perspective in which a number of outside
organizations or individuals have the power to select
technologies and force the members of the group to accept
them (Sneddon et al. 2010).
The fad-fashion theory offers insight into the initial
stages of FID, which can be distinguished into three types:
farmer leadership within the community; NGOs or other
intermediate organizations; and government intervention.
Taking the diffusion of organic agriculture in Kenya and
beyond as an example, Goldberger (2008) explains the role
of NGOs as a ‘‘boundary organization’’ to build a strategic
bridge for communication, negotiation, and collaboration
between farmers, international donors, national and local
governments, and research institutions. While the NGOs
become the center of innovation diffusion, according to
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Igoe (2003, p. 881), a problem facing many internationally
sponsored NGOs is ‘‘NGO leaders become gatekeepers
between western donors and the communities that they
wish to assist.’’ Similarly, Williams and Woodson (2012)
view the role of NGOs as strong innovators and the role of
government as innovator through technological appropria-
tion. With an absence of NGOs in China, much research
(Wang et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2011) examines the effec-
tiveness of government intervention on agricultural inno-
vation diffusion and indicates a deficiency in effective
communication with farmers. Given the importance of
effective communication and shared understanding
between farmers and external stakeholders, a question
arises regarding the role of farmer leadership.
Amending the narrow technology transfer model, the
agricultural innovation systems (AIS) perspective concerns
how society generates, disseminates, and utilizes knowledge
for poverty alleviation and livelihood security in the devel-
oping world (Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004; Rivera and
Rasheed Sulaiman 2009; Lundvall 2010). The World Bank
(2006, pp. vi–vii) for example, defines an innovation system
as ‘‘a network of organizations, enterprises, and individuals
focused on bringing new products, new processes, and new
forms of innovation into economic use, together with the
institutions and policies that affect their behavior and per-
formance.’’ Based upon systems principles, an analysis
framework has been proposed to reveal ‘‘complex relation-
ships among diverse actors, social and economic institu-
tions, and technological and institutional opportunities’’
(Spielman 2006, p. 42). In relation to FID studies, for
instance, Biggs (1990) identifies multiple sources of inno-
vation, including: users and practitioners (e.g., research-
minded farmers, innovative research practitioners, research-
minded administrators), innovations from NGOs, innova-
tions from private corporations, and innovations from
extension agencies. Furthermore, Pant and Odame (2006)
illustrate a tripartite partnership model comprised of public
sector, for-profit private sector and non-profit private sector,
with the informal sector located at the center. While this
approach accommodates more factors to aid understanding
the causes for and consequences of agricultural innovation
diffusion, farmers are still left in a marginal position due to
the hierarchical nature of its structure. As a result, the con-
tribution of farmers to agricultural innovation is likely to be
underestimated. Furthermore, with an emphasis on knowl-
edge sharing and intra-organizational links, this approach
seems to underestimate the differences and communication
barriers between farmers and other stakeholders due to dif-
ferences in values, interests, and attitudes.
Actor innovation networks originally focused on the
study of scientific research methodology, emphasizing the
nature of the interconnection and interaction between nat-
ure, technology and society (Schneider et al. 2012). With
respect to sustainable resource management, a ‘‘social
learning’’ perspective has emerged and is becoming
increasingly popular, in which local or indigenous knowl-
edge is critical for scientists and professionals (Leeuwis
and Van den Ban 2004; Dewulf et al. 2005; Eshuis and
Stuver 2005; Risk et al. 2007). Viewing nature as ‘‘an
active, lively, constructive, and relational presence, rather
than only as metabolism’’ (Goodman 2001, p. 190), actor-
networks ‘‘consist of not only human, but also non-human
actors such as equipment, animals, natural resources, texts
and norms’’ (Schneider et al. 2012, p. 244). As a result,
‘‘scientific and technological innovation is conceptualized
as the result of networking building between heterogeneous
actors’’ (Schneider et al. 2012, p. 244). Not limited to
indigenous knowledge, the role of farmers has been sig-
nificantly extended in this perspective as they have become
one of the most important actors in building the commu-
nication networks between professionals (scientists and
agricultural extension experts) and nature systems (Wu and
Pretty 2004). Lorentzen (2010) calls for research on the
connection between external technology transfer and local
innovation diffusion, and on community or user-driven
innovation. Regarding the impact of the rise of global food
safety standards and environmental sustainability, Perez-
Aleman (2012) emphases the necessity of increasing net-
works between farmers, government and nongovernmental
organizations for local knowledge building. However, the
actor-network theory seems to pay little attention to
political factors and the role of government, which deter-
mines the space for local farmers in technology choice and
network building.
Having briefly reviewed the relevant literature, we can
draw the following conclusions concerning progresses and
research gaps in innovation diffusion studies. First, despite
different angles and perspectives, it is rather common for
all schools of thought to recognize the importance of
communication networks for innovation diffusion. Second,
it is also no different to acknowledge the importance of
farmer participation in innovation networks, although dif-
ferent scholars may have different opinions over what roles
farmers can play in the network. Third, less research has
been done into how a collaborative network is built and
what the relationship is between farmers and government
in the process of innovation. Given the fact that there is
strong government intervention in innovation diffusion in
China, the rest of this paper will focus on network building
and the role of government intervention.
Conceptual framework
By bringing relevant literature together, this section aims to
set a conceptual framework for field observation and data
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analysis of FID. With respect to conditions underpinning
FID, in particular, we pose the following elements and
relations between them for the purpose of interpreting FID:
technology appropriateness, government intervention,
farmer leadership, and collaborative networks.
First of all, not all but only a few farmer innovations
may have the potential to be diffused to other locations.
Sharing Schumacher’s perspective (1973), we pose tech-
nology appropriateness as an important condition for FID.
Based upon the research findings on farmer innovation in
China’s marginal areas (Wu 2003), the term technology
appropriateness in this paper contains two aspects: (1) the
interface of a ‘‘new technology’’ with the local farming
production system and learning capacity; and (2) suitability
to the local market and farmers’ needs for technology
development. The former refers to the gap between new
and old technology and the coping strategy adopted by
local people, while the latter is related to farmers’ per-
ceptions or calculation of costs, benefits, and risks.
Following the suggestion of the fad-fashion theory, we
are concerned with the influence of external factors, in
particular government intervention, on the farmer’s adop-
tion of a new technology. Government intervention here
refers to the role of government in selecting, promoting,
pursuing, and supporting farmers to accept and adopt a
farmer innovation on a larger scale and/or within a short
time-scale. The motivation for government intervention
may vary: for instance, the needs of the local economy and
farmer income growth, expectations or judgments about
technology appropriateness, and political pressure. As a
key variable for FID, government intervention can be
measured in two ways: commitment to the FID process,
and capacity in terms of technology selection and mobili-
zation of various resources (including administrative,
economic, and political measures).
Parallel to external government intervention, according
to fad-fashion theory, equally important is internal influ-
ence on farmers’ decision to adopt or refuse a new tech-
nology. Farmer leadership is an important variable for FID
not only because individual farmers are not homogeneous
in terms of understanding and taking the opportunities from
the outside, but also because they may not be able to
communicate directly with external stakeholders and gov-
ernments without their representatives. With a focus on
FID via the public domain, farmer leadership becomes
even more important in dealing with government inter-
vention and developing meaningful and efficient commu-
nication with community members for collective actions.
Similar to Rogers’ (1962) ‘‘opinion leader,’’ farmer lead-
ership is not necessarily an innovator or village adminis-
trative leader although such a role may help him/her to
reduce potential resistance significantly. More important is
that he or she has a good understanding of the value of the
new technology; communication skills required to access
public resources and reduce potential risk; a strong com-
mitment to the majority of, if not all, community members
for their share of opportunities and potential benefits; and,
most importantly, full trust and respect from community
members.
Neither government intervention nor farmer leadership
may be enough for FID unless a collaborative network is
taken into account because FID cannot be achieved without
a channel or base to carry out communication, interaction,
and cooperation among farmers, and between farmers,
governments, and other stakeholders. Learning from the
actor innovation network perspective, collaborative net-
works become a crucial condition or variable for FID.
Differently, the collaborative network here emphasizes
mutual respect and trust for effective communication and
interaction between farmers and stakeholders. It cannot be
narrowly defined as the communication and mutual trust
between farmer leaders and governments, which is not
enough to mobilize or pursue the majority of community
members to participate. Essentially, a collaborative net-
work is a network of mutual learning, understanding, and
trust, leading to information circulation, sharing, and
feedback among farmers themselves and between farmers
and external participants. In this sense, FID can be viewed
as a process of network building for collective actions
toward local technological, economic, and social changes.
The above elements are interwoven and interact.
Bringing them together, a triangular model for conditions
of and relations behind FID can be illustrated as in Fig. 1.
The potential and explanatory power of the FID system
model can be illustrated and tested through a case study of
winter greenhouse diffusion (WGD) in China. We have
selected WGD for three reasons. First, this is typical of a
farmer innovation that started in one place and has subse-
quently been widely diffused and adopted, in this case by
millions of farmers in China throughout two decades.
Second, this case involves three locations across different









Fig. 1 FID system: an analysis framework
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of the above cases involve government intervention in
different ways with different consequences for WGD.
Fieldwork settings: historical context for government
intervention
Government intervention in agricultural innovation in the
People’s Republic of China can be traced back to the
People’s Commune regime established in the late 1950s.
While all rural labor was assembled for collectivized
agricultural production, without any space for individual
farmers, the promotion of agricultural innovation was listed
as an important objective for rural development.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, an agricultural
extension network was established nationwide that matched
the three-tier agricultural management system (Commune,
Brigade, and Production Team). This was comprised of
four tiers: an agricultural research and extension centre at
the County level, an agricultural extension station at the
Commune level, a farmer innovation group at the pro-
duction brigade level and individual farmer technicians at
the production team level (Delman 1991).
Predominated by Chairman Mao Zedong’s philosophy that
the people are masters and innovators of social development, a
bottom-up paradigm was imposed. As a result, the experience
of farmers was highlighted which was equally, if not more
highly, valued as the scientific knowledge from professionals.
In practice, all professionals, including agricultural research-
ers, university teachers, and students, were required to stay in
the countryside for a certain period in order to familiarize
themselves with local knowledge and farmers’ production
practices. The purpose of professional participation in the
countryside was to foster a mutual learning process and bring
experienced farmers, relevant professionals, and government
officials together toward best solutions and full use of local
knowledge, resources, and opportunities.
Within this highly political atmosphere, it may be
questioned whether the above model was effective in
practice. While farmers were indeed brought to the center
of agricultural innovation, less attention was paid to agri-
cultural research and the opinions of professionals, which
impeded the development and diffusion of modern agri-
cultural technologies.
A fundamental change has happened since the late
1970s when rural economic reform led to a replacement of
the People’s Commune regime with a Household
Responsibility System. The new system offered more
freedom for farming households to make their own deci-
sions on agricultural production and labor allocation. It led
to a breakdown of the established agricultural extension
network, forcing local government to explore new ways of
extending agricultural technology.
Unlike Chairman Mao, Deng Xiaoping put emphasis on
scientific research and the application of modern agricul-
tural technology. This represented a paradigm change in
which farmers were no longer in equal partnership with
professionals. Instead, they became marginalized in the
modern agricultural innovation system. Agricultural sci-
entists and researchers are at the top, agricultural extension
agents in the middle and farmers at the bottom.
Reflecting upon the change in the agricultural innova-
tion paradigm, there have been a series of adjustments in
agricultural innovation policies. At the national level, pri-
ority has been given to agricultural research and develop-
ment into high technology agriculture for securing grain
growth in order to cope with the challenges of an
expanding population. At the local level, commercial
agriculture and non-agricultural employment were priori-
tized by local authorities for economic growth. Thirdly,
facing a breakdown of the original agricultural extension
network, local governments at county and township levels
took responsibility for agricultural extension through a
combination of administrative, economic, and fiscal
measures.
Even so, farmer innovation has not been entirely ignored
by the Chinese government, in particular local govern-
ments. There are many valuable practices, such as the case
discussed in this paper. To understand the diffusion pro-
cess, fieldwork was conducted by the authors in three
places, Wa Fangdian in Liaoning Province, Shouguang in
Shandong Province, and Zhidan in Shaanxi Province, in the
mid-1990s and late 2000s respectively (see Fig. 2). Qual-
itative research methods were used including field obser-
vation, collection of historic information, and in-depth
interviews with key informants within villages and local
governments.
Our fieldwork in the three counties was undertaken
based upon different sources, and at different times. The
fieldwork in Wa Fangdian and Shouguang was undertaken
in 2008 when we learned from media reports about this
case. It started from a visit to Shanyuanzhue Village within
Shouguang County, the center of large-scale FID. This trip
led to another trip to visit to the innovation source in Wa
Fangdian, Liaoning Province, to learn about the technol-
ogy’s invention and early diffusion. The fieldwork in
Zhidan, a poor county in north Shaanxi, was taken sepa-
rately by the first author in the mid-1990s (Wu 2003).
A narrative of winter greenhouse diffusion
The conditions of FID and the role of network building can
be illustrated by the case of WGD. This innovation was
started in the mid-1980s by a few farmers in Wa Fangdian
in Liaoning Province. It was later transferred to Shouguang
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County in Shandong and then disseminated widely in
China. This section provides the background of winter
greenhouse innovation and diffusion in different places
based upon our field studies.
Background of winter greenhouse innovation in Wa
Fangdian
The winter greenhouse for cucumber production without
supplementary heating was successfully introduced in
1985. The key technology breakthrough was made by two
young farmers, Tao Yonghua and Li Yongqunin, both in
Taotun village, 1 km from Wa Fangdian City center.
Greenhouses for vegetable production was not totally
new to local farmers as glass greenhouses had been
adopted by a few collective Brigades in the 1960s in this
area, which depended upon coal heating for vegetable
production in winter. Replacing glass by plastic covers, the
so-called ‘‘summer greenhouse’’ appeared in this area in
the 1970s as it could be used in summer only without
supplementary heating. Farmers could gain benefits from
the summer greenhouse as they could earn more money via
planting and supplying vegetables for urban residents a few
weeks earlier than those who did not have this greenhouse.
Furthermore, a significant technology innovation, grafting
for enhancing cold-resistance capacity, was made by a
farmer in Zhang Shanzui Village in 1981, which made it
possible to plant and harvest cucumber in late March,
2 months earlier than conventional methods. Based upon
the above technological progresses in the early 1980s, Tao
and Li made another breakthrough, successfully building a
plastic-covering greenhouse for cucumber production
throughout winter without any heating device. Bearing in
mind the cold winter in this region (-23 C in the coldest
winter of the 1980s), this innovation involves many tech-
nology improvements and synthesis: greenhouse architec-
ture structure (e.g., the thickness and height of the rear wall
of the greenhouses), direction of the house for maximum
absorbing of sunlight and avoidance of strong winds,
selection of suitable materials and control of inside tem-
perature, etc.
The successful application of the winter greenhouse for
cucumber production throughout the cold winter without
any heating assistance is a symbolic technological break-
through. This is because cucumber is more sensitive to
temperature and difficult to cultivate in cold weather. Not
limited to cucumber production, the winter greenhouse was
soon applied to other varieties of vegetables, such as
tomatoes, eggplants, etc., then to flowers, fruits, aquatic
products, livestock, and poultry. The winter greenhouse for
vegetable production not only enriched the Chinese peo-
ple’s winter vegetable basket, but also increased the
farmers’ income significantly. For instance, Tao earned
more than 10,000 Yuan from his winter greenhouse only in
the first year of his innovation, compared with less than
1,000 yuan per capita as the net annual income of rural
residents in this region.
Autonomous diffusion in Wa Fangdian
Despite the successful innovation made by Tao and Li,
there was no follow up within the village for many reasons.
First, the local government planned to reclaim their land
for urban use soon so were reluctant to make any invest-
ment on it. Second, it was quite easy for local farmers to
find non-farm employment opportunities with similar
income to vegetable production. Third, compared with
non-farm employment, winter greenhouses require hard
Fig. 2 Location of case study
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work (for rolling up and putting down straw curtains),
experience and techniques in vegetable production, and
more importantly a large amount of investment, around
5,000 yuan (for the costs of plastic covering sheet, con-
struction materials such as wood, bricks, cement). Such
large investment was equivalent to the annual income of a
high-income family in this area, a high barrier for villagers.
The route of the innovation diffusion in Wa Fangdian
can be seen from Fig. 3.
Large-scale diffusion in Shouguang
The WGD was slow within the boundary of Wa Fangdian
until 1989 when Shuoguang County government became
involved and took serious steps to promote WGD. In his-
tory, Shuoguang has had a long tradition for vegetable
production. Compared with Wa Fangdian, climate condi-
tions in Shouguan have also much better for vegetable
production as its average temperature in winter is 6–7 C
higher than Wa Fangdian.
The information on winter greenhouse innovation
arrived in Shanyuanzhu (SYZ hereafter) village in 1988
when a village member went to Wa Fangdian to purchase
cucumbers for local distribution. This raised the interest of
Wang Leyi, head of the village. He invited the innovator,
Tao, to provide teaching and technical support for a WGD
project in SYZ. As Tao did not accept this invitation, his
neighbor, Han Yongshan, a young farmer took this
opportunity and moved to SYZ for demonstration and
technological support with Wang.
Initially, no villagers were willing to join this project
due to large investment required. Wang mobilized 17 vil-
lage communist party members to join this project. In a
joint effort with Han and with full support from the county
government, all participants were successful in adopting
this innovation by the end of 1989 and many households
earned over 20,000 Yuan, more than double that of those
who did not join.
Seeing the success, Shouguang county government
decided to diffuse this technology in the county in 1990. A
steering group was established and headed by the county
governor. Wang and Han were invited to be technical
consultants, in charge of communication with all partici-
pants countywide to sort out technical issues. As a top
priority of the county development project, the government
mobilized a concerted political effort, which required all
township governors and village heads to sign a responsi-
bility contract to ensure the success of WGD in their
controlled territory. Meanwhile, the county government
provided different support for this project, including adding
irrigation systems to secure water supply and supporting
animal husbandry for manure supply. As a result, a total of
5,130 greenhouses were successfully established in the
year and average household earnings from vegetable pro-
duction rose as high as 15,000 yuan.
The success of government intervention in Shouguan
attracted the attention of both local and national media,
leading to a rapid spread of winter greenhouse technology
beyond Shouguan and the provincial boundary. Since then,
many government delegations nationwide and leading
political figures, including President Hu Jintao (in 2005),
have visited SYZ Village and Shouguang County, and it
has become highly regarded in the role of government
intervention in FID. Meanwhile, Shouguang has become a
national diffusion center of winter greenhouse technology,
as many farmer technicians were invited by local govern-
ments nationwide to provide technical consultation and
services.
Uneven diffusion in Zhidan, north Shaanxi
The successful experience of WGD in Shouguang has
greatly encouraged local governments nationwide to learn
from Shouguang in government intervention for FID. This
is particularly true for those poor counties, including Zhi-
dan County, where the government viewed intervention in
FID as an important means for local economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation. This was an important reason
why the WGD was selected as a part of the inter-provincial
cooperation between Shaanxi and Shandong under the
umbrella of the national poverty alleviation program. As aFig. 3 The route of winter greenhouse diffusion in Wa Fangdian
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result, a farmer technician from Shandong was selected and
sent to Zhidan as a consultant for WGD.
Bearing in mind the complexity of local environments,
economic development, and farmer learning capacity, not
all government interventions were successful. In fact, there
were many unsuccessful cases. The story below of WGD in
Zhidan shows the unevenness of government intervention
in the poor areas of China (Wu 2003).
Zhidan is a located in north Shaanxi (see Fig. 2), which
is covered by numerous hills and gullies. As a transitional
area between agriculture and animal husbandry, traditional
farming systems with the feature of over-cultivation on
slopes had caused serious environmental consequences
such as soil erosion. In addition, Zhidan was nationally
recognized as a poor county where over 30 % of the
population was below the national poverty line in the mid-
1990s when our fieldwork was conducted. To cope with
rural poverty and soil erosion in Zhidan, the local gov-
ernment emphasized agricultural innovation and WGD was
one of the government projects in the early 1990s.
Like many agricultural extension projects in Zhidan,
however, there was strong resistance to WGD in a number of
the selected villages because of past experiences with cases
of failed government projects. To remove this resistance, the
government recruited labor forces from outside to cut down
live crops in the targeted area and also provided financial
subsidies to cover the costs of the materials for building the
greenhouses. Three years later, unfortunately, most of
greenhouses had disappeared. The failure, according to local
informants, was related to many factors. First, the new
technology was too complicated for local farmers who were
used to the traditional farming system with little external
input and cropping management experience. Second, the
invited consultant knew nothing about the local environment
and could not offer good advice. Third, there was not a stage
of local experimentation and demonstration before wide
diffusion. Finally, participating farmers were unable to
make profits due to a limited local market and the small scale
of vegetable production.
The exception was one village, called Dongwugou (DWG
hereafter), 8 km away from the county seat, in which most of
the winter greenhouses are still active and which has become
a base of vegetable production for urban residents. To
understand why the WGD has been successful in DWG, an
investigation was conducted in the village (Wu 2003).
Before the 1990s there were only four households in
DWG involved in vegetable production of a few crops
(e.g., potato, Chinese cabbage, radish, etc.). Surplus labor
flowed into non-farm areas. The turning point for vegetable
production in DWG was the introduction of greenhouse
farming in 1993, when the county government decided to
develop a winter greenhouse for vegetable production in a
number of villages in valley areas, including DWG. Unlike
other villages, the majority of winter greenhouses have
survived. A factor contributing to the successful adoption
in DWG was the existence of summer greenhouse before
the introduction of the winter greenhouse. Furthermore,
DWG continued to develop and utilize the winter green-
houses to raise seedlings to supply to summer greenhouse
and non-greenhouse producers, which benefitted both
sides. During one long winter, the users of vegetable seeds
came to the winter greenhouse to contribute their labor for
raising seed on the one hand, and exchange cropping
techniques and experience on the other. By 1997, there
were, in total, 10 households engaging in winter green-
house production, 20 in summer greenhouses, and another
20 without greenhouses. Meanwhile, about 20 households
in DWG were involved indirectly with service activities,
such as the delivery of organic manure from the urban
areas to the vegetable fields.
The success in DWG cannot be separated from the role
of Wang Jianbao who acquired a good reputation for many
innovations in Zhidan. He was the first adopter of the
summer greenhouse in the county and the first supplier of
vegetable seeds through his winter greenhouse. Equally
important was his social capital and personal characteris-
tics, such as his kindness and lack of self-aggrandizement,
which provided a sound social basis for technology learn-
ing and diffusion.
Case analysis and discussion
The previous section has outlined the process of WGD in
three locations: technology invention and autonomous
diffusion in Wa Fangdian, large-scale diffusion in Sho-
uguang, and uneven diffusion in the poor county of Zhidan.
Despite great variety in terms of geographic, economic,
and technological environments, some common elements
and different features can be analyzed and compared
through our analytical framework explained before. Rele-
vant research findings can be summarized as follows.
Differing from Rogers’ model of linear innovation dif-
fusion, FID cannot be fully understood unless the com-
plexity and diversity of local environments (broadly
ecological, economic, and social conditions) are taken into
account. For this purpose, we use ‘‘appropriateness of
technology’’ (Schumacher 1973) as a condition of FID in
order to reflect the interface of an innovation with local
technical systems and farmers’ needs. The appropriateness
of technology can be used to interpret the reason why the
winter greenhouse technology was not adopted by other
members within Taotun, the home of the invention, where
non-farm employment dominated. It was also an important
factor responsible for the difficulty of adopting this tech-
nology in Zhidan, due to the domination of traditional
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farming production that was based upon extensive use of
slope land with little labor and fertilizers inputs. None-
theless, the cases of autonomous diffusion in Tianjia and
other villages in Wa Fangdian and group learning in DWG,
Zhidan show the importance of an ‘‘intermediate technol-
ogy,’’ the summer greenhouse, which provided the foun-
dation for the successful adoption of the winter greenhouse.
With respect to the successful experience in Shouguang,
this confirms a conclusion drawn by Wu (2003,
pp. 142–143) that the appropriateness of technology is not
an absolute or constant, but a variable, which varies with
local environments or conditions in receiving communities.
Technology appropriateness, however, does not neces-
sarily secure individual farmers’ participating in FID due to
many constraints such as information, risk, and experience.
Similar to ‘‘opinion leaders’’ in the innovation diffusion
(Rogers 1962) or fad perspective in the fad-fashion theory
(Abrahamson 1991), we pose ‘‘farmer leadership’’ to inter-
pret the large-scale WGD in Shouguan which was difficult to
imagine without Wang Leyi, whose success in his village
won the trust and respect of large numbers of farmers. The
same was true for the case of Dongwugou in Zhidan where
Wang Jianbao and his winter greenhouse became a center of
‘‘group learning’’ and cooperation despite poor external
innovation environments. Different from the expectation of
either classic innovation diffusion or fad-fashion theory,
however, the farmer innovator is not necessarily a farmer
leader in FID. Tao Yonghua in Taotun, for instance, was a
great innovator but did not become a strong leader in WGD.
He played the role of consultant for technical advice but
refused to organize and pursue farmers in his village or
wider communities, including the opportunity provided by
Shouguang. This is one of the reasons why WGD in Wa
Fangdian was slow and limited to a few villages compared
with the huge impact in Shouguan. A conclusion can be
drawn from the above comparison: the stronger the leader-
ship existing within a rural community, the larger the scale
of farmer participation in FID.
Farmer leadership, similar to the appropriateness of
technology, may not be enough for large scale FID unless
the government becomes involved and makes a positive
intervention. This is partly because small farmers in China
are scatted under the current Household Responsibility
System, and partly because the government controlled or
monopolized public resources (e.g., finance and agricul-
tural production elements) in the past, which can be used
for disseminating relevant information and reducing mar-
ket risks. In the case of WGD, strong government inter-
vention can be found in Shouguang where political
mobilization, technical and infrastructure support, and
inter-governmental coordination jointly ensured successful
diffusion within a short period. This is in contrast to the
weak, almost non-intervention from the Wa Fangdian
government. Zhidan is an example intermediated between
the two, where the government introduced an expert from
Shandong Province and took administrative means to ini-
tiate the process without a field experiment or demonstra-
tion stage. Filling the knowledge gap in innovation
diffusion studies, this paper draws attention to the roles of
government intervention in FID, which varies with other
conditions. Under favorable conditions of appropriate
technology meeting to common needs of farmers, gov-
ernment intervention becomes necessary and important for
the large-scale participation of local farmers in FID.
Our empirical study confirms the actor network theory
in terms of communication networking, social learning
process, and the role of farmers as a key stakeholder. It
shows, furthermore, the core element behind FID is mutual
trust between farmer leaders and other community mem-
bers and between farmers and local governments. In the
case of Wa Fangdian, despite no formal communication
existing between farmers and government, the existence of
informal social networks among farmers was responsible
for innovation diffusion across village boundaries. In
Shouguang, the collaborative network was initiated by
Wang Leyi, who introduced the external expert, and con-
tacted the county government for support. Taking this
opportunity the government had not only mobilized all
county resources to participate but gave high regard to
Wang and invited expert, Han, to lead the project, resulting
in enhancing the collaborative networks. It was the network
building that provided a sound foundation for mobilizing
massive farmers’ participation in such a short period. By
contrast, there was no trust between farmers and local
government in Zhidan (Wu 2003) due to so many failed
cases of agricultural extension in the past, and also no time
to build mutual trust between local farmers and external
experts or the government. Likewise in the case of Wa
Fangdian, an informal collaborative network existed in
DWG village, which was further enhanced in the process of
WGD. Among many other conditions and factors, a col-
laborative network provides a foundation for successful
FID. In other words, FID can be viewed as a process of
collaborative network building in which mutual respect and
trust between farmers, and between farmers and stake-
holders, have been stabilized, developed, and enhanced.
Three types of collaborative network building emerge
from this paper, which have different impacts on FID:
1. Informal networks built by farmers themselves. This
means that there is neither farmer leadership, nor
government intervention or public resources involved,
resulting in small-scale and/or low-speed FID. This can
be applied to a large number of cases in Wa Fangdian.
2. Farmer-led networks farmer leadership exists or
emerges in the process of FID, which may not only
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bring interested farmers together but also attract
government support and public resources. This is
suitable for the case of DWG village in Zhidan.
3. Government-facilitated networks, in which the govern-
ment’s full commitment is matched with proper public
resources and strong farmer leadership, to develop and
enhance mutual trust, effective communication, and
productive cooperation among and between farmers,
governments, and other stakeholders for large-scale or
high-speed FID. This is the case of Shouguang.
The four conditions above, however, are interwoven,
which determine the success or failure, as well as the scale
and speed of a FID. The case of WGD has demonstrated
the explanatory power of the FID model described in Fig. 1.
By bringing many elements from appropriate technology,
fad-fashion, and actor network theories together plus gov-
ernment intervention, the FID model nonetheless offers an
alternative interpretation on the FID phenomenon in China,
and perhaps other strong central authoritative economies,
vis-a`-vis classic innovation diffusion.
Conclusions
This paper aimed to reveal the various conditions of farmer
innovation diffusion (FID) within an environment of strong
government intervention or control. Based upon a critical
review and synthesis of relevant literature, a framework for
FID analysis has been established, which was applied to a
case of WGD in three locations of China: Wa Fangdian,
Shouguan, and Zhidan. A number of research findings and
conclusions can be drawn.
First, FID should not be understood merely as a process
of individual farmers’ technological choice, as classic
innovation diffusion theory suggests. This paper has iden-
tified four factors that influence farmer’s decision-making:
the appropriateness of the technology to local environ-
ments, farmer leadership, government attitude and com-
mitment, and collaborative networks among farmers and
between farmers and governments. If any of these elements
is missing, FID is constrained.
Second, FID is largely dependent upon a process of
collaborative network building among farmers and
between farmers, government, and other stakeholders. This
process can be divided into three types: informal networks
built by farmers themselves, farmer-led networks, and
government-facilitated networks. Different types of net-
work building are responsible for different scales, speeds,
and consequences of FID. Building up mutual trust and
facilitating effective communication between farmers and
stakeholders is therefore crucial to understanding the pro-
cess and consequences of FID.
Third, based upon the successful farmer innovation
practices, government plays an important role in formal-
izing, facilitating, and scaling-up the collaborative net-
work, leading to an acceleration of FID on a large scale and
benefitting wider communities. It is crucial for the gov-
ernment to support farmer leadership and promote collab-
orative network building, which influences the success or
failure of government invention.
Fourth, it is important to note the timing of the WGD in
China. In the late 1980s and 1990s, when public resources
were limited and tightly controlled by the government, few
private resources were involved. Since then the FID envi-
ronment in China has changed significantly, which gives
more space for other agencies, both commercial (e.g.,
agribusiness companies) and non-commercial (e.g., various
NGOs), professional (e.g., agricultural extension institu-
tions), and non-professional (e.g., Internet users), to
become involved. Consequently, an amendment is inevi-
tably required when the analysis framework used in this
paper is applied to the cases of FID via other channels or
government intervention since the 2000s.
Finally, the conditions of FID presented in this paper are
not necessarily limited to China, but may be appropriated
for other countries with strong government control. An
international comparison could be beneficial for not only
improving government intervention and distribution of
public resources, but also promoting collaboration between
government, non-governmental actors, and farmers.
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